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  11. Introduction 
Amakudari is one of the practices, or informal institutions
1, most frequently mentioned in the 
literature of Japanese political economy. Amakudari means "descent from heaven”, which 
describes the reemployment of the officials retired from the government (= heaven) into senior 
management positions in private companies
2. 
 Since  amakudari is likely to cause favouritism between the regulators and the regulated, it is 
formally regulated by law. The National Civil Service Law prohibits the reemployment of the 
retired officials into the private companies until two years after their retirement, if they have 
worked for the national organizations closely related with those companies in the past five 
years. However, it is also provided that this prohibition does not apply if the National Personnel 
Authority (NPA) waives it after an investigation. Yet NPA only investigates the cases of 
high-ranking officials, and each ministry may give permission to the reemployment of others. 
Furthermore, many officials are often employed in public corporations or other non-private 
organizations immediately after their retirement and spend two years in these jobs to avoid an 
NPA’s investigation. In short, the law only prevents very direct connections, allowing the whole 
system to survive without much impact from regulation. Traditionally, the Japanese society has 
generally been tolerant toward amakudari, as it seemed to contribute to the country’s successful 
economic development in some ways. 
  Amakudari has, however, been severely discredited since the collapse of the bubble economy 
in the early 1990s. This is partly because the social credibility of bureaucratic management has 
been reduced due to the long-standing economic slump, the exposure of many bribery scandals, 
and partly because the scope of regulatory control has been reduced as a result of deregulation. 
                                                      
1 For instance, Pempel (1998: 95) clearly identified amakudari as an “institution”. 
2 However, some define amakudari in broader terms. For example, Colignon and Usui (2001) argue that 
the concept should also include the movement of retired officials into other public organizations and 
political life. Tsutsumi (2000) treats any type of bureaucratic reemployment as amakudari, including 
academic positions at universities. 
  2Consequently, some indicators have started to show a decline of amakudari practices in recent 
years. One of those indicators is the number of NPA agreements (Figure 1). The number of 
amakudari fell to roughly 50 in recent years, less than one sixth of the level in 1985. Although 
the numbers may partly reflect a tendency to bypass these agreements, the extent of the change 
is remarkable. Another indicator is the number of retired officials reemployed in executive 
positions in listed companies, provided by Kigyo Keiretsu Souran (Toyo Keizai Shimposha), a 
private publisher. According to this source, the number of newly reemployed officials in the 
listed companies fell from 77 in 1988 to 55 in 1998
3. 
<FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE> 
  While it may be significant to consider how the “real” number of amakudari cases has 
changed, the present study aims to examine qualitative, rather than quantitative, changes. 
However, the examination does not cover all types of practice, partly because of the difficulty in 
collecting all relevant information, and partly because the pattern of amakudari seems to vary 
from one type to another, and a holistic examination may obscure important industry-specific 
findings. Thus, this study focuses on amakudari into regional banks
4, a specific but important 
case. There are several reasons for this choice. First, regional banks are major destinations for 
officials retired from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Bank of Japan (BOJ). Reflecting its 
broad jurisdictional scope, MOF, as well as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 
was the most representative actor in the amakudari system (Okimoto 1988: 320; Ikuta 1995: 
                                                      
3 However, it is also shown that the number of amakudari officials sitting in executive positions increased 
from 993 to 1,061 in the same period, although with the share of amakudari executives in the total 
number of executive positions falling slightly (from 2.74% to 2.66%). 
4 Precisely speaking, regional banks are classified into two groups: “(first-tier) regional banks” and 
“second-tier regional banks”. The latter group is smaller, and its members were converted into regular 
banks only in the late 1980s. There is not much difference in their functions, despite the formal 
classification. This study does not distinguish between them but identifies them with the generic concept 
of “regional banks”. 
  381). The destinations of its retirees were thus widespread
5, but regional banks were one of the 
most prominent destinations, against the background of the ministry’s supervisory role (at least 
until the advent of the Financial Supervisory Agency in 1998). Regional banks were also the 
major destinations for BOJ retirees, although BOJ’s engagement in the management of regional 
banks is more limited, only through monetary policy measures. 
  Second, there was a significant change in the trend of amakudari appointments to regional 
banks, both from MOF and from BOJ. This seems to have resulted very typically from the 
reduction in the social credibility of bureaucratic management and in the scope of regulatory 
control, which may have caused some qualitative changes in the pattern of amakudari (see the 
third section). 
  Finally, it is important to clarify the mechanism of this connection between financial 
authorities and regional banks, in order to understand Japan’s ongoing economic crisis. 
Although national political discussion often focuses on a small number of largest banks, the role 
of regional banks is far from marginal. While the largest seven banks accounted for 47% of the 
deposits of all banks, in 2001, regional banks as a whole accounted for 45% (Japanese Bankers 
Association 2002)
6. 
  There have already been a number of studies focusing on the amakudari practices from MOF 
and BOJ into regional banks (Rixtel and Hassink 1998; Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001; Suzuki 
forthcoming). The first two studies were based on data up to the early 1990s. The last study use 
data through the 1990s, and examines how the presence of amakudari executives affects the 
management behaviour of banks. This study attempts to shed light on the pattern of amakudari 
appointments into regional banks and the change in the pattern over time. 
                                                      
5 For example, see Suzuki (2002) for the case of Fair Trade Commission.   
6 The other 8% belong to eight trust banks and a long-term trust bank. Postal savings, credit associations, 
and other financial companies are excluded.   
  4  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses four perspectives 
for understanding amakudari practices. The third section investigates the trend of amakudari 
appointment in the 1990s and describes several factors underlying that trend. The fourth section 
identifies the pattern of amakudari appointment throughout the 1990s with a statistical analysis 
of panel data. This is followed by the conclusion. 
 
2. Perspectives on amakudari practices 
Although  amakudari is a popular practice in Japan, it is seldom considered systematically. 
There are numerous arguments and discussions about it, and they can be classified into the 
following four perspectives: human resource, communication, monitoring, and incentive. 
1) Human resource perspective 
Utilizing valuable human resources is the reason most often mentioned in the official statements 
of ministers and recipient companies. For example, Masaru Hayami, the governor of BOJ since 
1998, believed that ‘[amakudari executives] are those who were recruited because their special 
knowledge and experience were appreciated’
7. Likewise, Hakuo Yanagisawa, Minister of 
Financial Sector from 2001 to 2002, implied that the recruitment of retired officials would be 
necessary because ‘the number of those who are able to manage various practices with special 
financial knowledge and with strategic foresight is very limited’
8. In fact, the Japanese 
government has recently established a system to help private employers obtain information from 
retired officials
9. 
  With regard to those officials reemployed into top executive positions, they may well be 
highly resourceful in some areas. After all, only a few high-ranking officials are considered for 
an appointment to such good positions. Since internal promotion is highly competitive in the 
                                                      
7 House of Representatives, the 155th Session, Budget and Finance Committee, Vol.1, 29 October 2002. 
8 House of Representatives, the 151th Session, Budget and Finance Committee, Vol.13, 31 May 2001. 
9 See National Personnel Agency (2001), Chapter 10, for details. 
  5government, it is not surprising that those appointed to top positions have valuable human 
capital that helped them be promoted to such high positions. 
  It may be said that government retirees have considerable knowledge about relevant policies 
and regulations. Given that discretionary administrative guidance is often more important than 
legal text, it is beneficial for private companies to employ those who know the unwritten code 
of practices in government. Calder emphasized this aspect, arguing that ‘[t]he most important 
function of most former government officials in Japan is providing information to their adopted 
organizations, concerning both likely regulatory actions by their former employers and more 
general economic and political developments’ (1989: 392). 
  However, their contribution is debatable. From his observations of the collapse of the bubble 
economy and an interview with a MOF retiree, Hartcher concluded that amakudari officials had 
‘no notable insights into how bank lending was contributing to the accumulation of a large 
speculative bubble in land and stock prices’ (1998: 121). It should also be noted that regional 
banks might be biased to overestimate the resources of government officials, due to a somewhat 
exaggerated appreciation of the university (University of Tokyo) whose graduates occupy the 
largest share of high-ranking officials in the government. As a Japanese banker pointed out in 
an interview, ‘they [regional bank executives] simply believe that MOF-retired officials must 
have special knowledge and information to the extent that those regionally employed can never 
achieve, because they are the graduates of University of Tokyo’ (Amyx 2002: 287).   
2) Communication perspective 
While the human resource perspective tends to put more emphasis on the benefits reaped by 
recipient companies, the communication perspective illuminates the mutual benefit between 
recipient companies and home ministries. From this perspective, amakudari is often considered 
to be the glue reinforcing the public-private relationship in business. Johnson, for instance, 
argued that ‘[a]makudari provides one more channel of communication for the government, the 
business community, and the political world (1982: 71). Wolferen (1989: 45) went further, 
  6saying that ‘the amakudari bureaucrat surpasses any official channels in his effectiveness in 
maintaining the flow of information between bureaucracy and enterprises’. 
  For recipient companies, it is significantly less costly and more effective to communicate 
with the government via amakudari executives than to access the bureaucracy anonymously 
from the general entrance hall. Amakudari officials are often quite useful in encouraging 
incumbent officials to listen to their companies’ voice, even if they cannot always force 
incumbent bureaucrats to meet their demands. From the company’s point of view, it feels 
entitled to enjoy such special treatment in return for its salary payments to amakudari 
executives. For those companies, the expected benefit of communication via amakudari 
executives must exceed the cost of their employment. 
  For home ministries, incumbent government officials also seemed to enjoy communicating 
via  amakudari executives, at least until the mid-1990s. According to a 1993 survey of 
bureaucrats, 43% believed that amakudari was beneficial because it developed the connection 
through which they obtained policy demands from the private sector (Nihonkeizai Shimbunsha 
1994: 424). From this perspective, amakudari officials are viewed as the agent of their home 
ministries, acting as the terminals for information gathering. The assumption here is that they 
“work” for the sake of their former employers, even though they are formally working for the 
private firm. 
3) Monitoring perspective 
Extending the communication perspective, the monitoring perspective assumes that amakudari 
executives convey even such information that companies would rather not reveal, playing the 
part of regulator. From this perspective, retired officials are most likely dispatched to companies 
with some problems, seeking what is happening in the company’s management, to help their 
home ministries consider better solution. To those who prefer to keep the problems secret, the 
use of amakudari executives seems to be better than the mobilization of incumbent officials.   
  7  The public authorities would also be inclined to utilize amakudari executives as informal 
regulators. While formal and direct control, e.g. nationalization, may be more effective, the 
government seemed to prefer such an informal approach, because they knew that ‘another 
request for public funds could only bring greater political wrath’ (Amyx 2001: 61). It should 
also be noted that monitoring via retired employees (or those seconded just before retirement) 
has been common in Japan, between private companies and their largest creditors, so-called 
“main banks” (Aoki 1994). 
  The monitoring perspective implies that amakudari may well contribute to moral hazard. 
While the informal monitoring through amakudari is useful in avoiding unnecessary 
disturbance, it may well exacerbate a problem when the government fails to solve it. Conditions 
may become worse, and disturbance may increase when the public learns both the extent of the 
problems and the fact that the government tried to solve the problems secretly. This may cause 
moral hazard to both the government and recipient companies. The government is reluctant to 
make the problem open once it has been committed, and tries to hide it. Knowing the 
government’s reluctance, companies may well seek special secret treatment. In other words, ‘the 
more closely aligned incentives … induce regulators to design regulations to produce economic 
rents for the regulated industries’ (La Criox and Mak 2001: 218). In this context, amakudari is 
considered a rent-sharing scheme. 
  Moral hazard may also occur at the level of company management, when company managers 
regard the employment of amakudari executives as ”insurance” against failure. Consistently, 
Horiuchi and Shimizu implied that banks tend to take more risk when they employ ex-MOF 
executives, with the empirical evidence being that the ratio of equity to asset is negatively 
correlated with the employment of ex-MOF executives (Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001). This 
author reaches the same conclusion with more recent data and a different set of control variables 
(Suzuki 2003). 
  8  It should also be remembered that amakudari executives could catch moral hazard. After all, 
there is no formal contract between the government and amakudari executives. There is no 
compensation for good monitoring, nor sanction for bad work. In other words, their 
principal-agent relationship is unstable. Amakudari executives may be diligent in their mission 
since they are often deeply attached to their home ministries, partly because they had worked for 
a long time and partly because they feel indebted to the ministries’ arrangement of their 
reemployment. They might also be afraid of being judged to be incompetent by their former 
colleagues. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that they would hide the information that may risk 
their current status, even against the interest of the government. They would understandably be 
reluctant to announce a problem that may cause bankruptcy, since it could mean the loss of their 
own income. 
4) Compensation perspective 
Amakudari is also described as a system providing incentives to government officials to work 
hard. While intense competition for internal promotion in the government ensures a high quality 
of amakudari appointees - as stated in the context of the human resource perspective, such 
competition is created by the expectation of the reemployment into bank positions with high 
social status and good working conditions. As Aoki pointed out, ‘the longer a bureaucrat 
survives in the ranking hierarchy of the ministry, the better are his/ her prospects for 
post-bureaucrat amakudari positions’. Amakudari positions are thus considered ‘the final prize 
in the competition among bureaucrats in the ranking hierarchy’ (Aoki 1988: 266). 
  Those who take this perspective often mention the salary of bureaucrats, which is apparently 
lower than that of a typical employee in a private company. According to Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth, a roughly calculated mean wage for elite national bureaucrats was JPY 318,000 in 
1989, 11% lower than the monthly mean national wage. They also suspect that such 
comparisons understate the sacrifice of those bureaucrats, since they would have earned much 
more than the mean national wage at private companies, being the brightest graduates from the 
  9pre-eminent universities (1993: 116-117). Indeed, the above-mentioned survey of bureaucrats 
also shows that 22% of the respondents thought that amakudari was necessary because their 
salary was low (Nihonkeizai Shimbunsha 1994: 424). In fact, the salary of top amakudari 
executives is conceived to be very high, especially because they often get a very generous 
retirement benefit several times by repeating reemployment and retirement. Such a benefit 
system apparently reinforces public criticism to amakudari, since retirement benefit is a 
one-time-only award for most of the other workers (Tsutsumi 58-63). 
  Another way to explain amakudari from this perspective lies in the retirement system of 
government officials. Traditionally, first-class officials are identified with the year of their 
university graduation throughout their careers, and there is a rigid custom that they should retire 
when their same-year colleague becomes the vice-minister, i.e., administrative head, of a 
ministry, so that the colleague can hold absolute seniority within the ministry (Johnson 1995: 
149-150). The vice-minister is thus expected to take care of same-year friends in return for the 
promotion. Since the promotion age to vice-minister is around the mid-50s, same-year 
colleagues should leave by that time. As a result, the average retirement age of the bureau chiefs 
giving way to their vice-minister colleague is around 55 (National Personnel Agency 1997; 
Rothatcher 1993: 173-174). Therefore, the amakudari system ‘makes for a lager turnover of 
government officials and the injection of young blood into the system’ (Blumenthal 1985: 320). 
In return for the early turnover, the ministry ‘has the responsibility to see to it that its graduates 
are well cared for in their postbureaucratic life’ (Prestowitz 1989: 235). 
  From the compensation perspective, it is also pointed out that amakudari encourages 
government officials to align their interest with that of private companies. ‘Since they will one 
day be responsible for the regulated firm’s operations, senior bureaucrats have incentives to 
ensure that regulated firms remain in good financial health, responding to opportunities for cost 
reductions and to changes in consumer demand’ (La Criox and Mak 2001: 217).   
  10  The above four perspectives are mostly complementary. In fact, amakudari is normally 
explained by a combination of some of those perspectives. This does not mean, however, that 
they are always consistent with one another. For instance, the monitoring perspective implies 
that government retirees are more likely to be appointed to weak requiring monitoring. If, 
however, the companies are very weak, they are less likely to offer a good salary - a 
fundamental part of the compensation perspective. 
  The expected pattern of the amakudari appointment differs across the four perspectives. 
From the human resource and the communication perspectives, amakudari executives may be 
appointed to a rather wide range of companies. Appointment to a limited number of weak 
companies is expected by the monitoring perspective. It may be true that weak companies tend 
to replace their executives; hence there are more chances for amakudari appointment. Yet new 
executives do not have to be ex-bureaucrats. When companies suffer from economic problems, 
they are perhaps more likely to require management resources rather than legal/ political 
knowledge. It may also be argued that weaker companies would be more likely to reinforce 
communication with the government by employing amakudari executives. However, this is the 
case only if amakudari executives are committed more to the regulatory process, that is, to the 
extent that the monitoring perspective envisages. 
  On the other hand, the compensation perspective implies that “chain appointments” are 
likely. A chain appointment is the appointment of a retiree from a ministry at the retirement of a 
predecessor from the same ministry. In this way, ministries may well save the costs of seeking 
new positions, investigating working conditions, and negotiating with companies for amakudari 
acceptance. 
  With these theoretical perspectives on amakudari in mind, the following sections carry out 
empirical analysis focusing on amakudari into regional banks from MOF and BOJ. Our main 
question concerns how the pattern of amakudari appointment through the 1990s fits those 
perspectives. Do any of those perspectives explain the amakudari into regional banks in the 
  111990s? Was there any change during the 1990s? If so, what was it? As the first step, the next 
section presents a general description of the trend of the amakudari into regional banks in the 
1990s, and discusses a number of factors that could potentially have transformed the system. 
 
3. Amakudari into regional banks in the 1990s 
Firm-specific data on amakudari executives are obtained from Kigyo Keiretsu Souran through 
1999 and from Yakuin Shikiho for 2000. They specify the names of the regional bank executives 
with work experience at public institutions. Sometimes they also specify the names of the 
executives with the working experience at other banks. They do not provide the data for all 
regional banks because they cover only listed companies. Since approximately 80% of the 
regional banks are listed, the data set should be sufficient to analyze the overall phenomenon
10. 
  Table 1 displays the number of amakudari into regional bank executives from MOF and BOJ 
throughout the 1990s. The number of amakudari executives from MOF generally increased in 
the early 1990s, but then the trend reversed afterwards. There were 92 MOF amakudari 
executives in 1994, but the number of the executives declined to 47 in 2000. The most 
remarkable change occurred in 1998, when 20 ex-MOF executives left their positions (including 
2 because of bankruptcy) but no new appointments were made. 
<TABLE 1 NEAR HERE> 
 For  the  amakudari from BOJ, on the other hand, the trend was rather consistent. With the 
exception of 1995 (+4) and 1997 (0), the number of amakudari executives decreased through 
the 1990s. Furthermore, the degree of annual change is generally smaller than the case of MOF. 
                                                      
10 However, it should be noted that amakudari is allegedly more likely to be appointed to non-listed banks 
and other smaller financial institutions, whose management profile is not presented so widely as listed 
banks. As a result, our dataset involves a risk of underestimating the likelihood of amakudari 
appointment. 
  12  In order to understand those trends, it should firstly be remembered that the social credibility 
of bureaucratic management has been reduced, as noted in the first section. This was typically 
the case in the field of financial and monetary policy. As Cargill (2001: 151) noted, it turned out 
that ‘[t]he regulatory approach rooted in the old financial and monetary regime was not able to 
resolve the growing financial distress’ in the mid-1990s. One of the key events was the 
bankruptcy of Hyogo Bank in 1995. The political distress caused by the financial problem of 
housing loan companies called jusen also impaired the social credibility of the financial 
authorities. One of the largest security companies, Yamaichi Shoken, went bankrupt in 1997. 
This was followed by the bankruptcy and nationalization of Long-Term Credit Bank in 1998. 
Besides those problems, various bribery scandals and collusions between bureaucrats and banks 
were revealed, causing strong public emotion against bureaucrat elites. 
  The second factor to be noted is deregulation in the financial sector, which was partly the 
result of the reduction in the social credibility of bureaucratic management. The “Big Bang” 
deregulation started in 1998. More significantly, the function of supervising the financial sector 
was transferred away from MOF to a newly established organisation, the Financial Supervisory 
Agency
11. Meanwhile, BOJ seems to have reduced its authority, mainly due to the decline of 
national monetary policy in consequence of the development of international financial markets. 
 Furthermore,  amakudari itself has become a target of social criticism. No matter how 
company leaders evaluate it, 89% of middle-rank managers of private companies consider it 
“unnecessary” or “rather unnecessary” (Nihonkeizai Shimbunsha 1994: 433-444), for instance. 
Social criticism toward bureaucrats has grown in the course of the economic slump, as private 
employees recognize that public employees enjoy more stable employment status (e.g. no 
layoff) than themselves. Against this background, the cabinet and the Diet have discussed 
                                                      
11 The Financial Supervisory Agency was renamed the Financial Services Agency after its reorganization 
in July 2000. 
  13amakudari for a long time. However, no remarkable change has occurred thus far, at least in the 
formal institutional framework. 
  So how do those factors explain these trends in the number of amakudari appointments? The 
general downward trend is well explained from the human resource perspective. The reduction 
in the social credibility and regulatory scope of financial officials, especially after the advent of 
the Financial Supervisory Agency, would devalue their human resources, and thus banks would 
be less willing to employ the retirees. Banks would also see the career in the public sector as 
rather disadvantageous in light of severe social criticism toward amakudari. However, the effect 
of recent social/ regulatory changes may not be so much if retired officials are being hired 
primarily because they have accumulated good general skills and information about the industry 
over time. 
  The communication perspective may explain why amakudari appointments to MOF 
increased in the years immediately after the collapse of the bubble economy. In order to solve 
economic problems, bank managers would incline to increase communication with the financial 
authority. However, amakudari executives may be too costly if their function is only to 
facilitate communication. Banks would probably expect more than just communication, 
especially when they suffered from economic difficulties. Therefore, the monitoring perspective 
may be more appropriate than the communication perspective in order to explain an incentive to 
amakudari appointment after the collapse of the bubble economy. Banks would prefer 
amakudari monitoring, even though it means costly employment and regulatory intervention in 
management. After all, it is better than bankruptcy. 
  From the communication and monitoring perspectives, the decline in the number of ex-MOF 
executives in the late 1990s is explained primarily by the decline of the regulatory scope of the 
financial authority. This is also applied to the general downward trend of amakudari 
appointment from BOJ. It may not be coincidental that the number of amakudari executives 
  14from both MOF and BOJ started to drop sharply in 1998, when the government launched the 
“Big Bang” and established the Financial Supervisory Agency. 
  In contrast to the other three perspectives, the compensation perspective does not explain the 
trend by itself. After all, no remarkable change has occurred in the promotion system within the 
financial authorities. It was observed in the mid-1990s that ‘[t]here seems to be some agreement 
that the old promotion pattern needs to be less rigid’ (Schaede 1996), but that does not seem to 
have become widespread hitherto. Social criticism may have reduced the value of amakudari as 
an incentive for bureaucrats, but this does not explain the reduction of amakudari executives in 
regional banks. More retirees may choose to take another job or not to work, but regional banks 
are still attractive destinations of reemployment for many retirees, who would otherwise be 
offered less prestigious and less gainful jobs. 
  The current section has considered aggregate statistics. While they provide important 
information, our understanding is considerably restricted unless we analyze the pattern of 
amakudari appointment more closely. Using multivariate analysis, the next section investigates 
how MOF and BOJ retirees are appointed into regional banks. 
 
4. Pattern of amakudari appointment 
Corresponding to the variety of perspectives on amakudari executives, the pattern of their 
appointment may be considered in various ways. From the monitoring perspective, there must 
be a tendency that amakudari executives would more likely be appointed to weaker banks. 
From the compensation perspective, “chain appointment”, i.e., the appointment of a retiree at 
the retirement of a predecessor, should be more prevalent, as discussed above. From the human 
resource perspective, larger banks can more likely afford to employ a larger variety of 
executives, including ex-government officials with legal/ policy expertise. The pattern may be 
more random from the communication perspective. While larger banks may be more able to 
afford  amakudari employment, smaller banks would be keener to employ amakudari as a 
  15communication channel, for they would otherwise have more difficulty in direct communication 
with the government. From the viewpoint of the financial authorities, they would be happy to 
appoint their retirees to banks in various conditions, if they see amakudari only as a 
communication tool. 
  Furthermore, the appointment may be affected by the number of amakudari executives 
already on board, since some banks employ more than one government retiree from MOF, BOJ 
or both. Many small regional banks also employ retirees from nationwide banks or large 
regional banks in close connection with themselves, which is often regarded as amakudari as 
well. Nonetheless, it is unclear how the appointments of the retirees from MOF, BOJ and 
superior banks affect one another. 
  In order to consider amakudari appointment with taking account of all those conditions, this 
study applies a multivariate model, specifically logistic regression. The reason for choosing that 
particular model is that the variable to be explained is binominal, that is, whether or not a 
government retiree is appointed to a bank under certain conditions
12. 
Data 
Our panel data set includes 96 regional banks in the period between 1991 and 2000. It includes 
934 observations in total. It is unbalanced, partly because several banks went bankrupt before 
2000, and partly because a number of others started being listed after 1991. During that period, 
there were 60 appointments from MOF and 45 appointments from BOJ, as shown in the last 
section. Only one is appointed in most of the cases, but there are four cases (Hyogo Bank in 
1993, Osaka Bank in 1994, Hokuyo Bank in 1994 and Shinwa Bank in 1995) where two MOF 
retirees were appointed at the same time. To avoid too much complication for such a small 
number of cases, however, our model only considers the probability of the occurrence of 
amakudari appointment, regardless of the number of appointees. 
                                                      
12 For logistic regression, see Demaris (1992), for example. 
  16  To put it another way, we use a logistic regression model whose dependent variable is 
binominal. Since each bank has various characteristics that are different enough to affect the 
probability of its amakudari appointment, a conditional fixed effect model is applied. The 
model also includes time dummy variables on the assumption that the probability of amakudari 
appointment varies across different years, due to such factors as deregulation and social 
criticism. Therefore the model is presented as: 
Pr (yi,t = 1) = Λ (αi +β́Xi,t+δt) 
 y i,t = 1 where amakudari appointment is observed at banki in yeart; 0 otherwise. α and δ 
denote the effect of each bank and each year respectively.  Λ  is the logistic distribution function 
of  Λ(z) = exp (z)/ [1 + exp (z)].   
  The explanatory variables (Xi,t) are classified into four categories. The first category includes 
variables regarding static economic profile of banks. This includes the levels of equity and 
profit in terms of the ratio to asset, as well as the size of asset in the year (t-1) previous to the 
observation year. 
  The second category relates to the variables indicating dynamic situation. It consists of the 
changes in the profile of banks (equity-asset ratio, profit-asset ratio and asset size) from two 
years before (t-2) to the previous year (t-1) before the observation year. This category also 
includes the change in the economic circumstances affecting observed banks. As a measure of 
such economic circumstances, the change in land prices is used on the ground that banks take 
lands as collateral in most loan cases. The available data source (Todofuken Chika Chosa/ The 
Survey on Land Prices of Prefectures) provides the prefecture-average prices of commercial and 
residential lands, and the prices of commercial lands are applied since it seems to be more 
influential in the management of banks than the other. The use of prefecture-average data looks 
  17appropriate, since a regional bank usually runs its business within the borders of a particular 
prefecture. 
  The third category concerns amakudari executives of the same origin and includes two 
variables. The first is the number of those executives presently employed in the bank except 
new appointee, and the second is the number of those executives retiring from the bank, 
replaced with the new one. If amakudari appointment is carried out somewhat orderly, those 
variables should be correlated with the likelihood of new appointment. 
  The fourth category includes the variables describing the status of other executives. In the 
model of MOF amakudari, this means that the variables are the number of ex-BOJ executives 
on board, and the numbers of new appointments from BOJ and retirements of ex-BOJ 
executives. Likewise, the model of BOJ amakudari includes the corresponding numbers of 
ex-MOF executives as explanatory variables. Assuming that the status of the executives from 
superior banks may also affect the pattern of amakudari appointment, the number of those 
executives and its change from the previous year are also taken into account. 
 
Estimation and results 
The model is estimated with two different dependent variables, MOF amakudari and BOJ 
amakudari, and with four different combinations of the explanatory variables. Since a 
conditional fixed effect Logit panel model excludes the observation groups, i.e., banks, with all 
positive or all negative outcomes, the numbers of observations used for the analyses of MOF 
and BOJ amakudari are reduced to 378 and 361 respectively. 
  With regard to the explanatory variables, the first estimation only includes the variables in 
the first category in addition to the variables of panel identification, i.e., bank identification and 
time. The variables are increased category by category, and the fourth estimation includes the 
variables in all four categories. Even when all variables are included, the value of the variance 
  18inflation factor is less than 4 for all independent variables. This implies that none of those 
estimations suffer from serious multicollinearity. 
  Table 2 and Table 3 show the estimates of the explanatory variables for the analyses of MOF 
and BOJ amakudari respectively. In both analyses, the significance of the overall model, in 
terms of Likelihood Ratio (LR) chi-square statistics, improved remarkably when the 
third-category variables, i.e., the variables concerning amakudari executives of the same origin, 
are added to the model. The addition of the variables in the fourth category further increases the 
significance of the overall model. 
  With regard to MOF amakudari, statistically significant variables in the fourth estimation 
include profit-asset ratio, asset size, change of equity-asset ratio, change of profit-asset ratio, the 
number of other ex-MOF executives on board, and the number of new appointment of BOJ 
retirees. The contribution of the first two variables and the last variable is positive, while the 
others contribute negatively. 
  The negative contribution of the dynamic financial status (change of equity-asset ratio and 
change profit-asset ratio) may imply that banks were more likely to employ MOF retirees when 
their financial conditions went worse. This is consistent with the human resource, 
communication, and monitoring perspectives, which may suggest that banks would prefer either 
to enrich their human resources, to improve their communication with the authority, or to ask 
the authority for help, when they face financial difficulties. 
  On the other hand, positive contribution of profit-asset ratio and asset size means that MOF 
retirees were more likely to be appointed to more profitable and bigger banks, which may fit the 
compensation perspective. In other words, amakudari appointment seems to occur not just when 
banks are motivated, but also when it is attractive from the viewpoint of the retirees. 
  However, it should be noted that amakudari appointment is negatively correlated with the 
number of incumbent ex-MOF executives. This seems to reflect the fact that many banks have a 
fixed number of executive positions specifically allocated for MOF retirees. Yet it should also 
  19be remembered that our result does not show statistically significant contribution of the 
retirement of incumbent amakudari executives. This means that “chain appointment” is not a 
case, at least in our observation period.   
  The appointment from MOF is also correlated with the appointment from BOJ, although its 
statistical significance is rather weak. From this, it might follow that BOJ’s amakudari 
appointment occurs in the same manner as that of MOF. Nevertheless, our result of the 
estimation of BOJ amakudari marks a somewhat different pattern of correlations. 
  The positive contribution of equity-asset ratio may indicate that BOJ retirees tend to be 
appointed to more stable banks. This is analogous to the case of MOF retirees, although it is 
difficult to explain why BOJ amakudari is associated with stability, whereas MOF amakudari is 
associated with profitability and size. On the other hand, none of the variables regarding 
dynamic financial status and economic circumstances indicate any statistically significant 
contribution. Furthermore, the negative correlation with the change of the number of ex-bank 
executives is specific to the case of BOJ amakudari, while the negative correlation with the 
number of incumbent ex-officials on board is just the same as in the case of MOF amakudari. 
This implies that banks often treat BOJ retirees as an alternative to the retirees from other banks.     
 
<TABLE 2 NEAR HERE> 
<TABLE 3 NEAR HERE> 
 
5. Conclusion 
Amakudari is well known in Japan, but the literature on Japanese political economy has seldom 
examined it systematically. Moreover, it is often assumed to be a system that never changes. 
This assumption is apparently convincing particularly in the case of regional banks, where many 
incumbent  amakudari executives and even new appointments are still observed despite 
shrinking scope of regulation and growth in public scepticism about bureaucratic control. 
  20Nonetheless, we should recall the observation shared by the scholars of institutionalism that 
‘institutions themselves may be resistant to change, but their impact on political outcomes can 
change over time in subtle ways in response to shifts in the broader socioeconomic or political 
context’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 18). 
  The change in the pattern of amakudari appointments seems to be consistent with that 
observation. While “chain appointment” is often pointed out by the observations of the period 
prior to the 1990s (see Horiuchi and Shimizu 2001, for example), it is no longer the case 
according to our result. On the other hand, the fact that appointment is more likely to occur at 
profitable and big banks in the case of MOF amakudari and at stable banks in the case of BOJ 
amakudari justifies a traditional view that ‘retiring bureaucrats would “descend from heaven” to 
take high-level, high-paying jobs’ (Pempel 1998: 95), at least to some extent. 
  It is not clear how the amakudari system will change in the future, in consequence of such 
socio-economic changes as further deregulation and financial globalization. In April 2003, the 
Japanese government launched a reform of the promotion system of government officials to 
restrict the amakudari practice. To discuss the result of this effort is left to further studies. 
However, the key question is not how much amakudari appointments reduced in number, but 
rather how the incentives underlying those appointments are modified. The theoretical 
framework and the empirical observations presented in this study may be useful in addressing 
that question.   
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1991 14 6 0 3 75
1992 7 5 2 2 73 -2          
1993 5 11 0 3 82 9          
1994 9 18 0 1 92 10          
1995 7 7 0 0 92 0          
1996 7 1 2 0 84 -8          
1997 6 3 2 3 82 -2          
1998 18 0 2 0 62 -20          
1999 9 2 2 1 54 -8          
2000 12 7 4 2 47 -7          
1991-2000 94 60
1991 2 3 0 2 64
1992 9 4 2 2 59 -5          
1993 11 8 0 0 56 -3          
1994 6 4 0 1 55 -1          
1995 4 8 0 0 59 4          
1996 4 4 1 0 58 -1          
1997 4 5 1 0 58 0          
1998 6 4 1 0 55 -3          
1999 9 2 1 1 48 -7          





Source:  Toyo Keizai Shimposha, various years. 
  26Table 2  Estimation of the factors affecting amakudari appointment from MOF to regional 
banks 
Independent variables I II III IV
Financial profile of banks
Equity-asset ratio in the previous year (%) 12.762 12.984 69.788 93.979
     (0.34)      (0.28)      (0.87)      (1.02)
Profit-asset ratio in the previous year (%) -16.132 79.015 116.689 143.190
    (-0.35)      (1.25)      (1.79)
*      (2.01)
**
Asset size in the previous year (million yen, logg 0.461 0.722 5.030 5.108
     (0.28)      (0.45)      (1.98)
**      (1.65)
*
Dynamic financial status and economic circumstances
Change of equity-asset ratio from 2 years before -1.526 -9.048 -11.051
 to the previous year (%)     (-0.92)     (-2.64)
***     (-2.63)
***
Change of profit-asset ratio from 2 years before -0.044 -0.047 -0.046
 to the previous year (%)     (-2.34)
**     (-2.20)
**     (-1.95)
*
Change of asset size from 2 years before -3.387 4.684 3.489
 to the previous year (%)     (-0.61)      (0.58)      (0.38)
Prefecture-average prices of commercial -4.461 -8.148 -7.568
lands, change from the previous year (%)     (-1.37)     (-1.67)
*     (-1.47)
Amakudari executives of the same origin 
Retirement of ex-MOF executives, number -0.768 -0.742
    (-1.13)     (-1.10)
Other ex-MOF executives, number on board -5.073 -5.319
    (-5.65)
***     (-5.43)
***
Status of other executives
Ex-BOJ executives, number on board -0.688
    (-0.78)
New appointment from BOJ, number 1.799
     (1.86)
*
Retirement of ex-BOJ executives, number -1.544
    (-1.55)
Ex-bank executives, number on board 0.357
     (0.56)
Ex-bank executives, change from the previous -0.454
year (%)     (-0.80)








Note:  Wald statistic in parenthesis; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
  27Table 3  Estimation of the factors affecting amakudari appointment from BOJ to regional 
banks 
Independent variables I II III IV
Financial profile of banks
Equity-asset ratio in the previous year (%) 58.314 68.598 137.557 198.042
     (1.30)      (1.41)      (1.89)
*      (2.21)
**
Profit-asset ratio in the previous year (%) -46.979 -50.696 -112.412 -141.635
    (-0.90)     (-0.83)     (-1.38)     (-1.45)
Asset size in the previous year (million yen, logg -1.373 -1.018 -2.894 -9.355
    (-0.42)     (-0.28)     (-0.48)     (-1.34)
Dynamic financial status and economic circumstances
Change of equity-asset ratio from 2 years before -0.596 -0.890 -2.209
 to the previous year (%)     (-0.38)     (-0.48)     (-0.83)
Change of profit-asset ratio from 2 years before 0.009 0.001 0.026
 to the previous year (%)      (0.36)      (0.06)      (1.01)
Change of asset size from 2 years before -2.820 -3.930 0.165
 to the previous year (%)
Prefecture-average prices of commercial 4.502 2.700 9.258
lands, change from the previous year (%)      (1.36)      (0.72)      (1.64)
Amakudari executives of the same origin 
Retirement of ex-BOJ executives, number 0.667 0.316
     (1.07)      (0.42)
Other ex-BOJ executives, number on board -3.628 -4.864
    (-4.71)
***     (-4.54)
***
Status of other executives
Ex-MOF executives, number on board -0.654
    (-0.95)
New appointment from MOF, number 2.465
     (2.90)
***
Retirement of ex-MOF executives, number 0.026
     (0.03)
Ex-bank executives, number on board 0.810
     (1.23)
Ex-bank executives, change from the previous -1.615
year (%)     (-3.11)
***
Number of observations 361 361 361 361





Note:  Wald statistic in parenthesis; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. 
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